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DEMOGRAPHICS, FISCAL POLICY, AND U.S. SAVING IN THE l98Os AND BEYOND
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on U.S. saving, demographics, and fiscal policy. We
use data from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys of the l980s to consider the
effect of demographic change on past and future U.S. saving rates. Our
findings indicate that demographic change may significantly alter the U.S.
rate of national saving and current account position over the next 50 years.
The gradual aging of the population is predicted to lead to higher saving
rates over the next three decades with declines in the rate of saving
thereafter. Associated with these predicted saving rate changes is a
predicted improvement in the U.S. current account position is the 1990s, with
a very gradual deterioration during the subsequent decades. While
demographics is a potentially very important factor in explaining saving, it
does not appear to explain the drop in the U.S. saving rate in the l980s.













Like virtually all developed economies, the United States is projected to
experience a dramatic demographic transition over the next fifty years. By
2040 31.percentof the U.S. population will be 55 and older compared to 21
percent today (see Table 1). Most of this aging will occur among the older
old with the fraction of the population over 65 predicted to almost double.
While the burden on the working population of supporting dependents will be
reduced somewhat due to the lower projected ratio of children to middle aged
adults, the overall dependency ratio (the ratio of those under 18 plus those
65 and older to those 18 to 64) will rise from its value of .616 in the 1980's
to .730 in the 2040's.
A higher dependency ratio leads to more consumption relative to output
and a lower saving rate. For the U.S. •whichhas been experiencing a
remarkably low rate of saving in the 1980s, the prospect of even lower saving
rates in the future is daunting indeed. Since saving represents the increase
in capital, the saving decline would spell a decline in the capital—labor
ratio were it not for the fact that the demographic transition also involves
slower growth in the nation's labor supply. On balance, capital—labor ratios
are likely to rise in the developed economies (see, for example, Auerbach,
et.al. 1989). Higher capital—labor ratios will alter factor prices by raising
real wages and lowering the real return to capital. These changes in factor
prices will redound to the benefit of workers in the first half of the next
century, but to the detriment of contemporaneous retirees who will receive
lower returns on their savings. This intergenerational "incidence" of the
demographic transition will mitigate, somewhat, the increased fiscal burden
expected to fall on future workers.—2—
The sizeofthe burden on future workers will depend, of course, on the
fiscal policy response to the demographic transition. With the very
significant 1983 Social Security Amendments (that raised the Social Security
retirement age and made Social Security benefits taxable under the income tax)
the retirement\disability portion of the Social Security payroll tax appears
to be in long run financial balance. In contrast, the medicare component of
Social Security is slated to require additional funds or benefit cuts around
the turn of the century. These projections reflect the Social Security
Administration's (SSA's) intermediate actuarial assumptions. According to the
SSA's pessimistic projections, the combined retirement\disability and medicare
programs will be in significant financial trouble by 2020. Even the
pessimistic projections assume the accumulation of a substantial Social
Security trust fund over the next two decades which will help pay for the
retirement benefits of the baby boom generation. If the federal government
responds to the near term Social Security receipts by reducing payroll or
other taxes, as is now being done implicitly by including social security
surpluses in meeting the Cramm—Rudman—Hollings deficit targets, the result
will be even larger burdens on the children and grandchildren of the baby
boomers.
A related concern about fiscal policy has to do with the growing
political power of the elderly. While the elderly, defined here as those 55
and older, currently represent one fifth of the voting age population, they
will represent almost a third of potential voters by 2020. In exercising
their increased political power the elderly may seek additional transfers from
the government, which ultimately means from young and future generations, or,
what amounts to the same thing, the elderly may seek to reduce their tax
obligations to the government. A recent example of this process is thedispute over the Medicare surcharge introduced in 1988 to pay for the
catastrophic health care for the elderly.
Since the elderly, as a group, appear to consume a greater fraction of
their wealth annually than the young (Abel, Bernheim, and otlikoff 1989) and.
certainly, than unborn generations, additional redistribution toward the
elderly will mean additional downward pressure on the U.S. saving rate.
This paper focuses on U.S. saving, demographics, and fiscal policy. It
addresses the following questions: First, what has been the pattern of
postwar U.S. saving rates —specifically,have saving rates declined in the
1980s and by how much? Second, is the apparent drop in the saving rate
dependent on how one defines saving? Third, is demographic change responsible
for low U.S. saving in the l980s? If not, what is? Fourth. how are the
projected demographic changes over the next fifty years likely to affect
saving rates during this period? Fifth, since the time path of saving rates
is critical to the time path of current account deficits in an open economy
such as the U.S., how will the demographic transition influence future current
accounts? Sixth, how do fiscal policy and demographics interact in affecting
saving, i.e., how much more detrimental to saving are policies that
redistribute toward the elderly if they occur at a time when the population is
quite aged?
The next section of this paper describes recent U.S. saving behavior,
pointing out that saving has declined in the l980s according to a variety of
alternative measures of saving and income. Section II uses data from the
Consumer Expenditure Surveys of the l980s to consider how demographics may
affect saving rates. The analysis uses the age—consumption, age—earnings, and
age—capital income profiles observed in these data and asks how saving rates
in the past as well as the future would have looked and would look were these—4—
profiles time—invariant. This experiment asks, then, how saving rates respond
to changes in the age distribution of the population holding all else
constant. The analysis leads to a prediction of higher saving rates in the
1990s, but steadily declining rates of saving thereafter. The results also
suggest, rather strongly, that demographics cannot explain the low rate of
U.S. saving in the 1990s, nor, indeed, the postwar pattern of U.S. saving.
Section III considers the interaction of future fiscal policies and
demographics with respect to future U.S. saving. We show that changes in the
age distribution of the population are likely to have Only minor effects on
government consumption and U.S. saving given the current pattern of government
consumption expenditures by age. In contrast, intergenerational shifts in the
burden of fiscal policy may shift the age—distribution of private consumption
and have important effects on future saving rates, with these effects
accentuated by the aging of the population.
Section IV turns to the question of future current account deficits. The
analysis here is partial equilibrium in nature in the sense that the world
interest rate is taken as given. Still, the results seem interesting. Our
calculations lead to the prediction of positive, but declining current
accounts (surpluses) over the next fifty years. Section V returns to the
question of saving in the 1980s, discussing other explanations for its
decline. Section VI summarizes and concludes the paper by pointing Out that
our approach toward understanding the effects of demographic change on saving
is only one of many that could and should be considered.
I. Recent Saving Behavior in the United States
£ meaningful discussion of the level and determinants of the U.S.
saving rate requires care in defining saving. In general terms, saving equals—5—
income less consumption, but one must resolve various ambiguities concerning
the measurement of income and consumption. There are a number of different
measures of aggregate saving, some of which bear little relationship to an
economist's notion of saving. In this section of the paper, we review and
evaluate the alternative measures commonly used and discuss their performance
during the past decade. This will provide a clearer picture of the recent
decline in the U.S. saving rate. Our analysis indicates that while the rate
of saving may depend heavily on one's definition, measurement issues alone do
not alter the conclusion that the rate of U.S. saving declined significantly
during the 1980s.
Before discussing these findings, it will be useful to review some
national income definitions and accounting identities. Because we are
interested in net additions to national wealth, we begin with the aggregate
income measure that excludes depreciation from Gross National Product (GNP),
Net National Product (NNP). Other income measures include disposable National
Income (DNI), equal to NNPplusgovernment transfers (R) less taxes paid (T):
(1) DNI—NNP—T+R
and disposable personal income (DPI), equal to disposable national income less
undistributed corporate profits, usually referred to as business saving:
(2) DPI —DNI—BS
Each of these measures of income, NNP, DNI, and DPI, is commonly used as a
base for measuring saving. (Note that, according to government accounting
procedure, transfers R include interest payments on the national debt to U.S.
households and businesses.)
In addition to different measures of income, alternative saving
measures are based on different notions of consumption. The most basic—6—
measure is household consumer expenditures from the national income accounts,
C. A broader measure would include government expenditures, C. To correct
for the fact that some household expenditures on consumer durables really
represent investment, and that, likewise, some government spending should
really be categorized as investment (there is no official government capital
account) one can adjust these measures by subtracting the investment component




Making these corrections also alters the corresponding measure of
aggregate income. Aggregate investment spending rises by CI +CI,
exceeding the decline in measured consumption by CI?. +CI?..To maintain the
consistency of the national income identity that net national product equals
consumption plus net investment plus government spending plus net exports, one
must therefore add the imputed rent on consumer and government capital to net
national product:
(5) NNPC —NNP+CIR+CIR
With these definitions of income and consumption, we now discuss recent
trends in U.S. saving behavior. Table 2 provides annual values of several
different measures of saving over the past decade. The first column presents
the personal saving rate, perhaps the most coonly cited measure of saving.
This is the fraction of their disposable income that households save,
(6) HSR —(DPI—C)/DPI—MS/DPI
It averaged 6.8 percent during the 1950s, 6.7 percent during the 1960s,
and 8.0 percent in the l970s. Annual values for the period 1980—82 fall—7—
among these averages. Since then the personal saving rate has fallen
considerably, averaging less than 4 percent during the period 1985—88. While
the personal saving rate has risen slightly in 1988, it is still well below
the averages of previous decades.
Though popular, the personal saving rate has several shortcomings that
raise questions about its usefulness. First, a significant fraction of saving
has traditionally been done by business, so looking only at personal saving
may provide a misleading picture of the overall saving rate. Second,
empirical research (David and Scadding, 1974 and, more recently, Auerbach and
Hassett, 1989) has suggested that personal and business saving are closely
related, that personal saving decisions respond to those of business and
cannot be understood in isolation. Third, the accounting conventions used to
define personal income and saving are of necessity arbitrary. For example,
though they are essentially equivalent transactions, the payment of dividends
reduces business saving and increases personal disposable income and saving,
while a redemption of corporate shares does neither. A rise in nominal
interest payments by corporations to households caused by an increase in the
inflation rate also increases measured household income and saving at the
expense of corporate saving, without anything real having happened. Since the
1980s has been a period during which the inflation rate and the mix of
dividends and share repurchases among corporate distributions has changed
significantly, these accounting conventions may distort one's inferences about
recent saving.
Moving to the private saving measure, which includes household and
business saving, eliminates these problems. Such a measure is given in the
second column of Table 2. This private saving rate,
(7) PS?. —(DPI+BS—C)/(DPI+BS)—(DNI—C)/DNI—PS/DNI—(HS+BS)/DNI
—(NNP—T÷R—C)/(NNP—T+P.)—8—
is essentially equal to the fraction of private sector disposable income not
consumed by households. It is higher than the personal saving rate but shows
the same drop in the 1980s. The private saving rate is more indicative of the
rate of household wealth accumulation than the personal saving rate because
households own businesses. If businesses accumulate assets, these assets
belong to households, and should therefore be included in our measure of
saving. A similar argument may be made with respect to government saving.
Accumulations of assets by the government increase national wealth, just as
private accumulations do. While the rights to such accumulations may be less
easily assigned to any one group of households, they certainly represent
additions to the wealth of the population (current and future) as a whole,
since the population controls (owns) the government. Like the personal—
private saving distinction, the distinction between government and private
saving is, according to much of economic theory, entirely arbitrary. For
example, a decision by the government to call social security contributions
"loans to the government", rather than "taxes", and social security benefits,
"repayment of these loans," rather than "government transfer payments" would
dramatically alter the reported values of private and government saving, but
should not alter the sum of government plus private saving. As before, this
point argues for a broader measure of saving including public as well as
private accumulations. Such a measure, defined by
(8) NSR —(DNI+T—R.—C--G)/(DNI+T—R)—(NNP—C—G)/NNP
is given in the third column of Table 2. This national saving rate equals the
fraction of net national product not devoted either to consumption or
government spending.—9—
Like the personal and private saving rates, the national saving rate
declined during the 1980s. However, the drop was more precipitous, with the
national saving rate averaging just 3.2 percent during the period 1985—8.
A final measure of national saving incorporates the corrections for
household and government investment discussed above:
(9) NSRC —(NNPC—CC—CC)/NNPC—NSC/NNPC
Thismeasure,given in the fourth column of Table 2, in general shows much
higher levels of national saving than the uncorrected measure in column 3.
This indicates that a considerable amount of national saving occurs through
the usually ignored channels of household and government purchases of capital
goods. However, the correction further accentuates the decline in national
saving in the l980s. While the average uncorrected national saving rate in
the 1980s was 3.5 percentage points lower than in the l970s, the average
corrected measure fell by 4.6 percentage points.
In sunary, the measures of the U.S. saving rate presented in this
section vary considerably in their estimates of the fraction of income saved
in the l980s. However, all measures of the saving rate indicate a very clear
decline during the l980s.
II.DemographicsandSavingRates
Severalresearchers have remarked about the relative stability of the
shape of U.S. cross section age—consumption and age—earnings profiles in the
postwar period (Kotlikoff and summers, 1981 and Carroll and Summers, 1989).
The stability of these profiles suggests asking what saving rates would be in
the future if these profiles retain their shapes and current levels; i.e.,
suppose consumption, earnings, and capital income at each age as well as the—10--
age—pattern of government consumption expenditure Stayed the same, how would
saving rates evolve over time as the age distribution of the population
changes? The methodology underlying this exercise is described in detail in
the Appendix. The population data used in this analysis come from the Social
Security Administration and represent historical figures and projections based
on intermediate assumptions. The relative age—sex consumption, earnings, and
capital income profiles were derived based on data from the 1980 through 1985
Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.2
The method used to determine the age—pattern of government consumption
expenditure is described in Auerbach, et. al. (1989).
Table 3 reports the average decade saving rates that are predicted based
on equation (1) for five different base years: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and
1987. There are several striking features of this table. First, for each of
the base years the saving rate is predicted to rise over the course of the
next three decades and then decline somewhat over the following three decades.
Taking 1987 as the base year, the predicted saving rate in the 1980s is 1.4
percent; it is 5.3 percent in the 1990s, rises to 6.5 percent in the period
2010—19, and then declines to 2.6 percent in the 2040's. The predicted
pattern of saving rates reflects the aging of the population coupled with the
fact that the difference between average (over males and females) earnings and
average consumption at a given age is, in the case of the 1987 base year,
negative for ages 20 and below, positive between ages 20 and 58, and negative
after age 58. Figure 1 plots the difference between average age—earnings and
age—consumption profiles for the base year 1980. The corresponding figure for
other base years is quite similar. Figure 1 can be compared with Figure 2
which plots the age distribution of the population for a select set of years.I
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A second important feature of the table is that the predicted pattern of
saving rates in this decade and the previous three decades do not match up
very veil with the observed pattern of saving rates. Prom demographics alone
one would have predicted high saving rates in the l950s and 1980s and low
saving rates in the l960s and l9lOs. Clearly, much more than demographics
appears to be at play in the data. Further research is needed to determine
the precise explanation for the failure of Table 2's predicted time pattern of
saving rates to match the actual post var pattern.3 Still, the table suggests
that demographic change can, itself, have very powerful effects on national
saving rates.
III. Future Saving Rates and the Interaction of Fiscal Policy andDemographics
The saving rate simulations of Table 3 implicitly hold constant fiscal
policy. This section considers how possible changes in government consumption
and intergenerational policy affect the predicted saving rates. We consider
first the question of government consumption spending, holding fixed the age—
consumption, age—earnings, and age—capital income profiles. With these
household profiles held fixed, Table 4 asks how the predicted national saving
rates would be affected by a change in our assumption about the response of
government spending to demographic shifts.
The calculations reported in Table 3 assumed a constant age—specific
pattern of government consumption spending. Table 4 presents simulations
based on the alternative assumption that government consumption per capita
remains fixed through time at the various base year values. That is, we hold
constant government spending per capita rather than government spending per
member of particular age groups. Under our previous assumption, increases in
per capita spending would automatically have been predicted by a shift (from—12—
the base year) in the share of the population accounted for by those groups,
such as the elderly, who individually receive substantial levels of government
services.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 shows that assuming fixed per capita
government consumption expenditures leads to only slightly lover predicted
saving rates over the next fifty years. At least one reason for this is that
the increases in per capita government spending anticipated in the simulations
reported in Table 3 are not that significant. Although the elderly receive a
disproportionate share of government spending, so do the young (primarily on
education); as the population ages, the decline in spending on the young
partially offsets the increase in spending on the old in the simulations
reported in Table 3.
Table 5 considers a related, but more extreme policy change. Suppose
that all funds spent on age—specific government items in the base year had
been directed toward the elderly, and that the level of this spending per
elderly person were kept fixed even as the fraction of elderly in the
population increased over time. This experiment reflects the potential shift
in government spending that would result were the elderly able to redirect all
age—specific spending toward themselves and maintain such spending levels over
time; it surely represents the largest plausible estimate of the possible
impact of population aging on government spending.
Since the predicted saving rates in Table 5 incorporate this very strong
assumption, comparing Table 5 with Table 3 indicates the maximum saving affect
likely to arise if the elderly, because of increased political influence, were
able to redirect all of age—related government consumption expenditure (which
excludes defense, etc.) to spending on themselves. Indeed, such an outcome
would have a significant impact on national saving. As the population ages, a—13—
large increase in government spending per capita would occur under the
assumptions used to produce Table 5. This leads to a significant fall in
predicted saving rates after the turn of the century. For example, using 1980
as the base year, we find that the predicted national saving rate for the
decade beginning in 2020 falls from 11.9 percent in Table 3 to 5.5 percent in
Table 5.
In addition to changes in government consumption, a second important
dimension of fiscal policy that can affect saving is the government's
intergenerational policy, by which we mean the extent to which the government
places the burden of paying for its consumption on different age groups. If
the growing political power of the elderly leads to reduced taxes on the
elderly and more transfers to them, this should have the effect of rotating
the age—consumption profile toward more consumption of the elderly and less
consumption of the young. Table 6 considers the effects of such a rotation on
the predicted saving rates. Specifically, we adjust the benchmark profile of
consumption by age (keeping base year consumption constant) by increasing the
relative consumption of those over 65 relative by 5 percent and reducing the
relative consumption of those under age 45 by 5 percent. Roughly speaking,
one may view this as simulating the effect of cutting taxes on the elderly by
5 percent of income and raising taxes on the young by 5 percent of income.
As a comparison of Tables 3 and 6 indicates, altering the age consumption
profile in this manner leads to somewhat higher predicted saving rates from
now through 2030 and lower saving rates thereafter. For example, in Table 3
the 1987 base case predicted saving rates for the 2010's and 2040's are .065
and .026 respectively; the corresponding Table 6 values are .059 and .016.—14—
IV.TheDemographic Transition andFutureCurrent Accounts
Given the openness of the U.S. economy, the significant saving rate
changes predicted by the simulations presented in Tables 3—6 imply potentially
large international capital flows and movements in the U.S. current account.
The current account is a closely—watched measure in the area of international
trade and competitiveness.
The current account surplus equals the difference between the
accumulation of assets by Americans (including the government) and investment
in the United States by Americans and foreigners. This difference, referred
to as net foreign investment, indicates, if it is positive, that Americans
are, on balance, saving enough to finance not only all investment in the
United States, but also some investment abroad. If, on the other hand, net
foreign investment is negative, saving by Americans is insufficient to finance
all current investment in the United States and some current U.S. investment
must be financed by foreigners. The implication of running current account
deficits (having negative net foreign investment) is, therefore, that more of
the capital at work in America will be owned by foreigners. Concern about
foreigners buying up American capital has heightened in the l980s as the
nation ran quite substantial current account deficits when measured relative
to net national product.
The demographic transition is likely to affect significantly future U.S.
current account deficits both by altering U.S. saving and, therefore, the
accumulation of assets by Americans and by altering the amount of investment
in the United States. In the presence of significant international capital
mobility, U. S. investment is determined, at the margin,not by the amount of
U. S. saving, but rather by the international capital market. Given the rate
of return that can be earned by investing abroad, investment will take place—15—
domestically up to the point that the return to capital in the United States
equals the internationally determined rate of return. The domestic rate of
return to investment will depend on the ratio of capital to labor; hence, it
is this capital—labor ratio that will adjust until the return to investment at
home equals the return to investment elsewhere in the world. Given the-supply
of U. S. labor, which is determined in large part by demographics, investment
(changes in capital) will occur up to the point that the U.S. capital—labor
ratio is such as to yield the internationally determined rate of return. Thus
demographics, by affecting the supply of labor, influence the amount of U. S.
investment as well as U.S. saving. Since the current account deficit is the
difference between U.S. investment and U.S. saving, demographics influences
the current account as well.
Section II demonstrated that the demographic transition is likely, over
time, to lower the rate of U. S. saving. Since the growth rate of U. S. labor
supply will also decline, demographics will also lover the rate of U. S.
investment (measured relative to NNP). The question is whether demographics
will reduce saving by more than it reduces investment.
Table 7 presents the predicted values of the current account deficits for
the next six decades divided by predicted net national product. The first
three columns of the table provide estimates based on the assumption of
constant world interest rates of 10, 7.5 and 5 percent, respectively. Each of
these columns shows large predicted current account surpluses throughout the
period, reversing the experience of current account deficits in the 1980s.
The trend is toward improvement in the current account surpluses over the next
30 years and a gradual deterioration thereafter.
Such simulations mayoverstatethe likely current account surpluses,
because they ignore the demographic shifts that will be occurring—16—
simultaneously in other countries. Many of the mature Western economies will
also experience population aging and associated increases in saving rates.
Together, these increases in saving worldwide can be expected to depress world
interest rates and reduce the outflow of funds from the United States. To
consider this issue, we repeat the current account calculations just
presented, this time assuming that the world interest rate falls gradually by
3 percentage points between 1990 and 2050 from the value initially assumed for
the simulation. However, even such a significant drop in world interest rates
only slightly diminishes the predicted surpluses over the period.
V. Alternative Explanations for the Recent Decline in U.S. Saving
While the demographic factors discussed in the previous sections may help
predict the behavior of saving in the future, and may have contributed to the
determination of saving in the past, they clearly cannot explain the behavior
of saving in the l980s. If our characterizations of the impact of
demographics is correct, then there must have been other, major determinants
of the rate of saving that pushed in the opposite direction during the 1980s,
to offset the rise (relative to the 60's and 70's) in saving one would have
predicted on the basis of demographic factors alone. This section of the
paper briefly considers several alternative explanations that have been
proposed for the decline in saving during the 1980s.
Government Consumtt ion
One potential explanation for low U.S. saving in the 1980s that can be
dismissed is that increased government consumption is to blame. Table 8
presents the ratio of government consumption to net national product based on
both the corrected and uncorrected data. The corrected data indicate that the—17—
ratio of total government (federal, state, and local) consumption to NNP was
Only one half a percentage point higher (22.5 percent versus 22.0 percent)
during the first half of the 1980s than it was during the period 1950 through
1979.
To measure the contribution of this small increase in the share of
government spending Out of NNPtothe observed decline in the national saving
rate, it is useful to consider the impact on national saving had the ratio of
private consumption, C, to the fraction of output absorbed by the
government, NNP—C, remained the same. That is, we may define a saving rate
out of private sector resources, which we shall, for convenience, call the
nongovernmentsavingrate (NGSR).
(10) NGSR—(NNP—C—C)/(NNP—G),
andconsider the impact of the increase in G/NNP holding this saving rate
constant. This saving rate differs from the private saving rate defined above
if the government's budget deficit, equal to government spending plus
transfers less taxes, C +R—T,is not zero (see equation 7).
The nongovernment saving rate seems to be the appropriate measure of
private saving to consider in thinking about changes in government consumption
assuming 1) that government consumption is not a close substitute for private
consumption and 2) that changes in government consumption are not associated
with changes in the intergenerational distribution of the burden of paying for
government consumption.—18—
Under these assumptions one would not expect a change in the fraction of
output absorbed by government spending to affect the rate of private
consumption Out of national output left over after government consumption (NNP
—C). If, instead, government consumption were a close substitute for private
consumption, increases in government consumption would likely be offset by
decreases in private consumption, leaving a smaller total impact on national
consumption and saving. By making the first assumption, that the
nongovernment saving rate is fixed, we are, therefore, biasing our analysis
toward a larger impact of government consumption expenditure on national
saving.
Changes in the intergenerational distribution of the burden of paying for
government consumption that accompany changes in government consumption
represent another reason that the nongovernment saving rate might change with
changes in government consumption. We have discussed above the impact that
such intergenerational changes might have on future saving, and will consider
them again below. However, making the second assumption, and thereby ignoring
the effects of such changes in the intergenerational distribution of the
fiscal burden, seems most appropriate for discerning the effect of increased
government consumption, per Se, on total national saving.
It is easy to see that the small rise in the ratio of government saving
to NNP could not, in itself, have had a very large impact on the national
saving rate. Using the definitions of the national saving rate (NSR) given in
expression (8) and the nongovernment saving rate (NCSR) given in expression
(10), wehavethe relation
(11) NSR —NGSR*(1—(G/NNP)]—19--
Expression (11) shows that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of C
to NNP, holding the nongovernment saving rate constant, would reduce the
national saving rate by only NGSR, or roughly one—tenth of a percentage point.
Had the nongovernment saving rate remained constant in the l980s at its
average level for the period 1950—79, the rise in government consumption to
NNP in the l980s would have reduced the uncorrected national saving rate for
the l980s from .089 (the average rate observed during the period 1950 through
1979) to .088. Hence, the nongovernment saving rate must also have declined
substantially during the l980s for national saving to have declined as it did.
Table 8 presents corrected and uncorrected measures of the nongovernment
saving rate, also repeating for convenience the national saving rates given in
Table 2. Regardless of whether one corrects the basic data for consumer
durables and government investment, the nongovernment saving rate has fallen
dramatically in the l980s. According to the corrected data, it averaged 16.2
percent over the period 1950 through 1979, but only 9.3 percent from 1980
through 1985.
Deficits and Intereenerational Fiscal Policy
While the government did not consume much more of NNP in the l980s than
in the previous three decades, many contend that the government, by running
large deficits, shifted the burden of paying for government consumption from
current to future generations. Such generational policy, the argument goes,
should induce a spending spree by current generations in response to their
reduced tax bill. As an explanation for the observed decline in saving,
however, this view encounters several problems.—20-—
The first problem concerns the measurement of the deficit itself. While
there is no doubt that the official government deficit rose more rapidly in
this decade than in any recent peacetime period, there is reason to doubt that
the government's generational policy was, on balance, as redistributive to
current generations as is commonly believed. A closer look at
intergenerational policy shows that a good deal of what the federal government
gave current generations with its right hand during the 1980s, it took away
with its left. For example, the 1983 Social Security amendments reduced the
future benefits of current young and middle age generations by an amount, in
present value, roughly equal to their gain from the income tax Cuts. If
current young and middle age generations understand this change and expect it
to be sustained in the future, they should view this loss in future income as
requiring them to consume less now and save more for their old age.
Even if one doubts that most individuals make the kind of rational,
present value calculations necessary to "see through" reported budget deficits
to the underlying effects of current and expected future fiscal policies,
there are other reasons to doubt that the deficit is to blame for our low rate
of national saving.
The strongest case for deficits leading to reduced national saving can be
made from a Keynesian perspective. The Keynesian argument goes like this.
Households base their consumption decisions on current disposable income.
Since the household saving rate is very close to zero, increases in disposable
income associated with increases in government transfers or decreases in taxes
will increase consumption nearly dollar for dollar, thereby reducing national
saving considerably.
One problem with the Keynesian approach is that it does not provide a
strong justification for the assumption that consumption is based primarily on—21—
current disposable income. One possible argument for such an assumption is
that American households are liquidity constrained, which in everyday language
meansthey have f cvliquidassets and consume everything they can get their
hands on. Hence, if the government takes less from them in the form of taxes
they viii consume today every dollar that would otherwise have gone to taxes.
However, essentially every study of liquidity constraints has demonstrated
that at moat 20 percent of American households are liquidity constrained; such
liquidity—constrained households probably account for, at most, 10 percent of
total U.S. consumption.
A second reason to doubt the importance of liquidity constraints is that
the growth of consumption expenditures, at least in the last five years, has
not been limited to nondurables and services, as one would expect if liquidity
constrained households were the cause of the increased consumption spending.
(They would not choose to provide for future consumption by purchasing
durables). The average over the last five years of the annual share of total
expenditures accounted for by durables is slightly higher than it was in the
period 1950 through 1979.
A third reason why the liquidity constraint argument doesn't square with
the facts has to do with the composition of the reported deficit. Interest
payments comprised much of the Federal deficits in the 1980s. For example, in
1985 $130 billion of the $196 billion Federal deficit represented interest
payments. Since liquidity—constrained households obviously aren't bond
holders, the key variable to consider for such households is how the
difference between taxes and transfers (excluding interest payments) changed
in the 1980s compared to the earlier period. And one should consider not
simply how Federal taxes less transfers have changed, but how this difference
has changed for all governments combined. For all (federal, state, and local)—22—
governments the ratio of taxes plus transfers to NNP averaged .220 between
1980 and 1987. It averaged .226 for the 1970's, .239 for the 1960s, and .224
for the 1950s. Hence, the share of taxes less transfers to NNP was only
slightly lover in this decade than in the previous three decades. In
considering these figures it is also worth noting that the very slight decline
in the 1980s in the ratio of net taxes to NNP primarily reflects a decline in
corporate taxation (which should not affect liquidity—constrained households)
In the l980s corporate taxes represented only 8.1 percent of total government
taxes. In comparison, they represented 15.2 percent of total taxes in the
1960s.
Finally, even if one ignores the problems with the liquidity constraint
argument (that would suggest omitting the interest component of the deficit)
and adopts the Keynesian assumption of a high marginal propensity to consume
additions to disposable income caused by budget deficits, this still fails to
explain the extent of the observed decline in the national saving rate. To
see that this is so, it is useful to note that the national saving rate (NSR)
as defined in (8) is related to the deficit, D (—C+R—T)and the private
saving rate (PSR) defined in expression (7) by the following identity:
(12) NSP. —PSR*[1.—(G/NNP)]—(1—PSK)*(D/NNP)
Given the near constancy of the ratio of government consumption to NNP over
the past several decades, one can conclude that, holding the private saving
rate fixed, a one percentage point increase in the deficit—net national
product ratio would decrease the national saving rate by l—FSB., or about nine——23—
tenths of a percentage point. Given the increase of 2.7 percentage points in
the deficit ratio during the 1980s over its average for the period 1950—79,
had the private saving rate remained constant at its 1950—79 average of 10.9
percent. the national saving rate should have declined by about 2.4 percentage
points during the 1980s. In fact, the national saving rate fell by much more,
about 4.5 percentage points, from the period 1950—79 to the l980s.
This greater decline in saving is evident from the sharp declines in the
personal and private saving rates during the 1980s, already shown in Table 2.
Even if deficits relative to NNP had not increased in recent years, this
pattern of private saving rates would have led to substantial declines in
national saving.
To summarize, even under the most extreme Keynesian view of deficits, one
that has weak theoretical justification, one can attribute only part of the
recent decline in national saving to government budget deficits. Under more
realistic views of the Keynesian model or other, more plausible, theories of
consumption, notably the Life—Cycle model, one would expect deficits to have
much smaller effects on saving, since households would be predicted to consume
only a small fraction of the increase in current disposable income provided by
the tax Cuts (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, Poterba and Summers, 1988).
Savins Disincentives
It is hard to argue that saving disincentives are responsible for the
decline in saving in this decade since in the first half of this decade the
Federal government reduced many saving disincentives. Foremost among these
was the steady reduction in marginal tax rates on household capital income.
from a top rate of 70 percent in 1980 to33 percent in 1988.—24--
Some of the policies used to promote savings, such as the IRA5, were,
unfortunately, poorly-designed to produce new saving and quite possibly
reduced rather than increased saving. Others, such as the move toward a
consumption oriented tax base associated with the adoption of the Accelerated
Cost Recovery System were not in place for long enough to have had a
significant effect on saving; simulation studies (e.g., Summers, 1981 and
Auerbach and otlikoff, 1987) indicate that many government policies aimed at
stimulating savings can have significant effects that are observed only after
decades, rather than a few years.
Increases in the Stock Market
-Mosttheories of consumption predict that households will increase their
spending in response to an increase in wealth. Since the l980s witnessed a
significant increase in stock market wealth, this may have led to additional
consumption. Because the increases in wealth are themselves excluded from
national income account measures of income, this, in turn, would overstate the
ratio of consumption to true income, and hence understate the true saving
ratio.
Bowever, the increases in consumption that may have occurred in response
to the rising stock market can explain only a small part of the declining rate
of national saving. By far the largest increase in real stock market wealth
during the 1980s occurred in 1985, when household equity increased in value by
$449 billion in excess of the inflation rate. For the period 1981—6 as a
whole, the cumulative increase in stock market wealth was roughly double this,
about $900 billion. Assuming that households consume 3 percent of their
wealth each year, a reasonable estimate based on past economic research, this
would have accounted for an increase of consumption equal to $27 billion, or—25—
.6 percent of NNP, in 1986, with smaller increases in earlier years and
(because of the crash in 1987) later years as well.
However, this estimate for the effect of wealth changes on U.S. saving- is
too high for the following reason. The stock market represents less than 15
percent of total U.S. wealth; for other assets there have, on net, been
offsetting capital losses over the 1980s. If one adds together capital gains
and losses for all U.S. assets net of liabilities over the period 1980 through
1988 the total capital gain is only $260 billion measured in 1988 dollars.
This represents only 1.7 percent of total 1988 U.S. net wealth. In the
absence of this cumulative capital gain the 1988 rate of private saving would
have been 6.5 percent rather than 6.3 percent, a very modest difference
indeed.
A Decline in Precautionary and Becuest Savin2?
Another potential explanation for the decline in private saving may be
the expansion of insurance which reduces the need for precautionary savings.
The government today provides disability insurance, unemployment insurance,
survivor insurance, earnings insurance (through the progressive tax
structure), life span insurance (through its social security annuities), old
age health insurance, nursing home insurance (through Medicaid) and poverty
Insurance (through its welfare programs). Economic research suggests that
each of these forms of government insurance, while of great economic value,
can have the undesired side effect of greatly reducing national savings.
Untangling the savings effects of the provision of each of these forms of
insurance is a formidable task, and one that is not likely to yield conclusive
answers.—26—
A related explanation for the decline in saving is a reduction in saving
for bequests, which may tie in with the decline in the birth rate. At least
half and possibly as much as two thirds of U.S. wealth can be traced not to
life cycle saving for retirement, but rather to private bequests and other
intergenerational transfers. It is hard to assess whether there has been a
decline in the bequest motive for saving, but such a decline would not be
surprising given the general deterioration of the family in the U.S. as
evidenced by the dramatic post war rise in the fraction of marriages ending in
divorce and the dramatic post war decline in the fraction of the elderly, even
the infirm elderly, living with their children.
Much of the saving associated with bequests that occurred prior to 1970
may have reflected the absence of significant annuity insurance. In 1960 old
age annuities were only a small component of retirement finances. Today,
social security and private pension annuities are, more often than not, the
major component of retirement finances. Annuitizing one's resources
eliminates the possibility of leaving such resources to the next generation.
In other words, many of the bequests that occurred in the past may have been
unintended, and with annuity instruments now widely available, there is less
scope for unintentional bequests. The counterpart of fewer unintentional
bequests and the availability of annuity insurance is that one can consume
more since annuities have eliminated the concern about spending one's
resources too quickly; i.e., the availability of annuities may have reduced
significantly precautionary savings in response to life span uncertainty.
Other Factors
There are several other factors that can be dismissed as possible
explanations of the decline in U.S. saving in the l980s. The business cycle—27—
is one such factor. While, as one would expect, each of the different saving
rate measures was low during the recessionary period 1981—1983, the rate of
saving did not recover during the subsequent and ongoing boom. For example,
the national (uncorrected), private, and personal saving rates in 1987 were
each lower than they were in 1982.
A second possible explanation is a reduction in income inequality in the
1980s. According to the Keynesian view a reduction in income inequality would
shift more income to the liquidity constrained poorer segment of society and
induce greater national consumption. The problem with this line of argument
is that income inequality increased rather than declined during the 1980s.
According to the Congressional Budget Office (1987) the share of total U.S.
disposable income received by the five percent of families with highest
disposable incomes was 18.9 percent in 1977, 20.1 percent in 1980, 23.2
percent in 1984, and 23.5 percent in 1988. The share of disposable income
received-by the poorest 30 percent of U.S. families was 8.6 percent in 1977,
8.5 percent in 1980, 7.6 percent in 1984, and 7.6 percent in 1988.
A third factor is the increase in female labor force participation that
occurred during the 1980s. This factor should, however, have increased
saving, since one would expect part of the increased earnings of females to be
saved. The saving rate should also have increased since, at least in the life
cycle model, the saving rate depends of the fraction of workers, who save, to
retirees, who dissave. An offsetting possibility is that increased female
labor force participation reduced the precautionary saving needed by single
earner couples in the event the single earner becomes unemployed.
VI.Summing Up—28—
This paper suggests that demographic change may significantly alter our
rare of national saving and our current account position over the next 50
years. The gradual aging of the population is predicted to lead to higher
ssving rates over the next three decades with declines in the rate of saving
thereafter. Associated with these predicted saving rate changes is a
predicted improvement in the U.S. current account position is the 1990s, with
a very gradual deterioration during the subsequent decades.
While demographics is a potentially very important factor in explaining
saving, it does not appear to explain the drop in the U.S. saving rate in the
1980s. Indeed, based on demographics alone one would have predicted saving
rates to be high and roughly equal in the 1950s and 1980s and considerably
lower in the 1960s and 1970s. What happened to U.S. saving in the 1980s
remains an intriguing puzzle.—29—
Table I
Population AgeDistributionsfor the U.S. by Decade
AaeGrorn1.Qs jQ's 7Q's19j.'sjQ's ZQQQ's
0—17 .329 .356 .318 .268 .256 .239
18 —25 .109 .114 .143 .140 .111 .110
25 —34 .133 .109 .125 .156 .146 .120
35 —54 .256 .240 .220 .228 .277 .299
55 —64 .090 .088 .092 .092 .083 .103
65 PLUS .084 .093 .102 .116 .126 .1.29
ge GroupZQQ's2020's 2030's ZQQ's
0 —17 .222 .216 .210 .207
18 —24 .106 .097 .097 .096
25 —34 .123 .117 .111 .113
35 —54 .269 .253 .255 .249
55 —64 .132 .128 .113 .120
65 PLUS .148 .188 .214 .215—30—
Table 2
Post War Saving Rates in the United States
YearsPersonal Private National National,
(HSR) (PSR) (NSR) Corrected
1950—1959 6.8 10.4 9.2 13.3
1960—1969 6.7 11.2 8.9 13.0
1970—1979 8.0 11.1 8.5 11.8
1980 7.1 8.9 6.8 8.4
1981 7.5 9.3 7.4 8.9
1982 6.8 7.6 3.2 4.7
1983 5.4 7,8 3.3 5.5
1984 6.1 9.3 5.7 8.6
1985 4.4 7.8 3.6 7.1
1986 4.0 7.2 2.8 na
1987 3.2 5.6 2.7 na
1988 4.2 6.3 3.8 na
na —notavailable
Sources: 1950—87: Economic Report of the President, 1989;
1988: Survey of Current Business, June 1989
Imputed rent on an asset is calculated as annual depreciation plus 3 percent
tines the stock of the asset. Annual depreciation of consumer durables and
government nonmilitary tangible assets as well as the stocks of consumer
durables and government tangible assets are reported in the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce's Fixed Reproducible Tan2ible Wealth in the United States. 1925—85.—31—
Table 3











1950—59.013.090 .128 .110 .117
1960—69—.041 .042 .082 .064 .074
1970—79—.037 .045 .084 .066 .075
1980—89 .014 .090 .128 .109 .115
1990—99 .053 .125 .160 .142 .147
2000—09 .068 .139 .173 .156 .161
2010—19 .065 .137 .170 .154 .160
2020—29 .045 .119 .151 .136 .146
2030—39 .030 .105 .136 .122 .133
2040—49 .026 .101 .132 .118 .129
* Thisaverage is over the period 1980—88.—32—
Table 4
The Affect of Demographics on Saving Rates for Fixed Age—Earnings and
Age—Consumption Profiles and Fixed Percapita Government Consumption
Predicted Savin2 Rates








Decade 1987 1970 1960 1950
1950—59 .016 .088 .123 .107 .118
1960—69—.031 .045 .081 .066 .080
1970—79—.029 .042 .083 .068 .081
1980—89 .016 .088 .123 .107 .117
1990—99 .050 .120 .154 .138 .147
2000—09 .063 .132 .165 .151 .161
2010—19 .059 .130 .162 .149 .150
2020—29 .043 .115 .147 .136 .140
2030—39 .030 .130 .136 .124 .140
2040—49 .025 .099 .131 .120 .136—33—
Table5
The Affect of Demographics on Saving Rates when All Age—Related
Government Consumption Expenditures Are All Spent on the Elderly
Predicted Savins Rates
Base Year
* Thisaverage is over the period 1980—88.
Actual U.S.
Decade 1987jQ 1970 1960 1950 Savina Rates
1950—59 .046 .110 .135 .113 .114 .092
1960—69—.007 .060 .084 .063 .068 .089
1970—79—.013 .054 .077 .056 .062 .085
1980—89 .019 .083 .105 .083 .089 .044*
1990—99 .045 .107 .127 .106 .112
2000—09 .056 .118 .137 .117 .125
2010—19 .037 .101 .117 .099 .111
2020—29—.012 .055 .065 .049 .070
2030—39—.047 .022 .029 .012 .040
2040—49—.053 .016 .022 .007 .034—34—
Table 6
The Affect of Demographics on Saving Rates When the
Age—Consumption Profile is Rotated in Favor of the Elderly
Predicted Savin2 Rates








Decade1987 1970 1960 1950
1950—59 .013 .091 .129 .091 .116
1960—69—.041 .042 .082 .044 .073
1970—79—.038 .044 .084 .046 .1.13
1980—89 .014 .090 .128 .090 .144
1990—99 .052 .124 .160 .124 .156
2000—09 .065 .136 .171 .138 .154
2010—19 .059 .132 .165 .135 .137
2020—29 .038 .112 .144 .117 .123
2030—39 .021 .097 .128 .103 .119
2040—49 .016 .092 .124 .099 .136—35—
Table 7
Predicted Current Account Surpluses Relative





.075 .05 jQ .075 .05
1990—1999 .027 .025 .023 .025 .023 .021
2000—2009 .052 .050 .049 .050 .048 .047
2010—2019 .062 .062 .062 .061 .061. .060
2020—2029 .047 .047 .047 .045 .045 .045
2030—2039 .030 .029 .029 .028 .028 .027
2040—2049 .025 .025 .025 .024 .023 .023—36—
Table 8




Period Savin2 RateSaving Rate QL____________
1950—1959 .133 .167 .203
1960—1969 .130 .166 .215
1970—1979 .118 .152 .223
1980—1985 .072 .093 .230













1.The corrected net national product measure adjusts the National Income
Accounts measure of net national product by 1) adding the imputed rent on
consumer durables and government tangible assets, excluding military equipment
(expenditure on which is treated as current consumption) and 2) subtracting
the depreciation on the stock of consumer durables and government tangible
assets (excluding military equipment). Corrected private consumption meast.re
equals private consumption expenditure on goods and services plus the imputed
rent on consumer durables. Corrected government consumption equals the
National Income Account measure of government consumption less government
expenditures on (nonmilitary) equipment and structures, plus the imputed rent
on government equipment (nonmilitary) and structures.
2. For the consumption profile the procedure began with an allocation of total
consumption reported by CES households to members within the household. Some
of the household consumption expenditure, such as child's clothing, could be
allocated more accurately than general expenditures such as food. Such
general expenditures were divided evenly among adults (individual's over 18)
and children, but under the assumption that each child's consumption of
general expenditures is one third of that of an adult. The resulting data,
which consisted of individual consumptions indexed by age and sex, were next
used to form the weighted (based on CES population weights) average value of
average consumption by age and sex for the quarter in question. These values
were then divided by the corresponding quarter's weighted average of
consumption of 40 year old males. The resulting relative consumptions indexed
by age, sex, and quarter were then regressed against fifth order polynomials
interacted with sex dummies. The predicted values from this regression
provide the values of the RC8 m andthe RCa f '•Themethod of deriving
the values of the Re m aid'theRca f i ssentially the same except
for the fact that rep6ried earnings are'ainuai and there is no problem of
allocating earnings to the correct individual. The same general method is
also used to derive the Rka m andthe Rka f profiles. However, rather
than using reported capital'iitcome which is lIkly to greatly understate true
capital income, we used the CES asset data to form annual observations of
weighted average net worth by age and sex. Netvorth is the sum of financial
assets, such as stocks, bonds, and checking accounts, real estate, less
mortgages and other liabilities. A description of the networth calculation is
provided in Abel, Bernheim, and Kotlikoff (1989).
3. A better fit does not arise from assuming that the ratio of child to adult
consumption of general consumption expenditures (those that can not be
identified in the CES data as child or adult—specific) is one half rather than
one third.—38—
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Appendix
Al. Simulating the Effects of Demographics on Saving Rates
The method used to simulate the effects of demographic change on saving
rates can be understood more precisely by looking at the following formula for
the national saving rate in year t, St.
120
c4OmbEfRamOant + Ra,f8a,f,t] + y,by,t'
S_l_ 120 120
k k e e
k E(R B +R S]+e E[R 8 +R 9
40,m,ba,m a,m,t a,m a,f,t 40,m,b a,m a,m,t a,f a,f,t
a—0 a—0
The first term in the numerator of the ratioin (Al) ispercapita private
consumptionin base year b. This is expressed as consumption per forty year
old male in year b, C4Omb multiplied by a summation. The terms Rcam and
Rc5f in the summation are, respectively, the ratios of average male and
average female consumption at age a relative to the average consumption of a
40 year old male. And the terms 8a,m,t and 8a,f,t are, respectively, the male
and female shares of the population age a in year t.The two terms in the
denominator of the ratio in (Al) are defined symmetrically, except that the
first deals with capital income and the second deals with labor earnings. The
terms g7. g0, and 8b are, respectively, the ratio of government
consumption expenditure per young person (age 0 to 18), per middle age person
(age 19 to 64), per old person (65 plus), and per capita. Finally, the terms
y,t' m,t and
are, respectively, the fraction of the year t population
that are young, middle age, and old.
Given base year values of 8yb' gm,b' 8o,b' 8b' C4Omb. e4Om,b,and
k40mb and the values of the relative age—sex consumption, earnings, and
capital income profiles (the RCamts Rc,fCcs, Re.s, Rkaf,ts—40—
ci andRka f onecan use equation (1) to determine how saving
rates would change with changes in the age—sex composition of the population
(the 9a,ft'' y,t'S Bm,t3 and B Theprocedure for
determining base year values of c4Ob, e4Ob, and k4ob is provided in
equations (A2) through (A4).
120
(A2) Cb —c40bE IRmPamb +RafPafb]
a—0
120




(A4) YK.0— k4Omb E [RmPamb +RafPafb]
a—0
Equations (A2) indicates that total consumption in year b, Cb, can be
expressed as the product of c4ob times the sum of the products of the age—
sex consumption ratios and the levels of population in year b in a given age—
sex category (the Pamb'S)• Equations (A3) and (A4) are the analogous
expressions relating e4omb to total labor earnings, Eb and k4ob to total
base year capital income, YKb. Given values of Cb. Eb, and b as well as the
terms within the summations of equations (A2), (A3), and (A4), these three
equations can be solved for c4Ob, e4Ob, and k4ob.
The procedure for finding r,b' a,b' g0,b' and gb is similar.
Specifically, we used Auerbach et. al.'s (1989) age—decomposition of
government consumption expenditure to determine the values of ,b' 8fl,b' 8ob
and which stand, respectively, for government consumption per person age
0—24, government consumption per person age 25—64, government consumption per
person age 65+, and percapita non—age—specific government consumption, g.—41—
Government consumption percapita in year t is then determined by multiplying
these four values by their corresponding populations in year t and dividing by
the total population in year t. Unfortunately, data is available only to
calculate values of 8y,b' m,b go,b' and b for the period of the mid l980s.
Hence, in the calculations presented below, these values are used regardless
of the base year indicated.
For each base year the value of total private consumption (used in (A2)
to solve for c4omb) corresponds to the National Accounts figure (unadjusted
for durables) for that year. In addition, base year net national product
(again unadjusted) is divided between labor and capital income using the
national accounts data on employee compensation and proprietorship income and
assuming that the share of proprietorship income that represents payments for
labor is the same as the ratio of aggregate labor income to net national
product.
A2. Simulating the Effects of Demographics on the Current Account
To simulate the effects of demographics on the current account we begin
by assuming a value, r, of the world interest rate. Dividing 1987 capital
income from the national income accounts by r gives us an estimate of 1987
U.S. assets, A1987.Tofind A1988,A1989, throughA2050weuse the following
formula:
(A5) At+l —A+ 5't
In (A5) At is assets at year t (e.g. 1987), is the year t saving rate as
calculated in Section II above with 1987 as the base year, and NNPt is net
national product in year t, which is also calculated as in Section II above
with 1987 as the base year; i.e., it is the sum of 1) average capital income—42--
of a 40 year old male in 1987 times the summations of the cross products terms
(the K'maOmat's and the Rkf a9fat'S) plus 2) average labor income of a 40
year old male in 1987 times the summations of the cross product terms (the
Rem a9m,a,t' and the RCfa9fats)•
The level of the capital stock at time t is determined by assuming a
Cobb—Douglas net (of depreciation) production technology for U.S. domestic
output, d.
(A6) —DK:L°
where D is a coefficient whose value is determined in equation (Al), a is
capital's share of net national product, and Lt is the supply of labor in year
t. The value for a was determined from the national accounts data. The value
of is given by the second summation in the denominator of equation (10).






Given a value for r and K1987 we insert the 1987 value of Lt and use (Al) to
solve for D. The value of K1987 is determined from the 1987 current account
reported in the national accounts. Specifically, r(K1987—A1987) is set equal
to the 1987 current account deficit less the 1987 trade account (exports minus
imports). This equation is then used to solve for K1987. Having determined
the value of D in (Al), we use (Al) to predict values of K1988 through K2050
by inserting the predicted values of Lt for the appropriate year in question.
Since the current account deficit in year t, CA, is defined as:
(A8) CAt —[K+i
— — [K+i—A1J—43—
we simply insert the predicted time paths of capital stocks and assets to
determine the time path of CAt.